ABSTRACT
The objective of this study is to examine the differences in the effectiveness and impacts of vouchers versus unconditional cash transfers in the Bushani camp of the Masisi territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo. As part of this research, the study team collected household data from over 230 households in the Bushani camp in September 2011 (before the start of the program), November 2011 (after the first two cash and voucher distributions) and March 2012 (after the last cash and voucher distribution). Households within the camp were randomly assigned to one of two interventions, namely, an unconditional cash transfer or a voucher (a coupon that allowed households to purchase food and non-food items for a fixed value on a voucher fair). Both interventions were worth USD $130. In light of the extreme vulnerability of all households in the camp, there was no pure comparison group (a group of households that received neither intervention).
A comparison of the baseline household and individual-level socio-demographic and economic characteristics suggests that both groups were similar before the program. Overall, cash households were slightly larger, were more likely to be female-headed, relied upon more income sources and had higher diet diversity than voucher households. With the exception of the female-headed indicator, none of these differences was statistically significant. Thus, this suggests that the randomized assignment of households to each intervention resulted in two groups that were similar, and so any differences observed after the program can be attributed to the different transfer modality.
Overall, the results of the research suggest that cash transfer households were able to use the transfer to buy a more diverse set of food and non-food items than voucher households. More cash households bought cereals, meat, condiments, oil and vegetables, medicines and housing materials than their voucher counterparts. These patterns were largely similar in November (after the first two transfers) and March (after the last transfer), despite very different transfer amounts in both periods.
All households were able to increase the value of their assets by 30 percent between September and March 2012, with similar trends in the cash and voucher groups. There was no evidence that cash transfer households were using the transfer to purchase “temptation” goods, such as alcohol.
How household in the two groups used the transfer also yielded some differences in objective measures of household well-being, as measured by asset ownership, food security and savings. The cash transfer group was more likely to save a portion of their transfer (between US$ 1.50-$2.50), less likely to suffer from food insecurity and more likely to purchase certain assets as compared to the voucher group. By contrast, more voucher households purchased metal sheeting and poultry than the cash group. There were no other differences in terms of diet diversity, the types of foods consumed, the types of coping strategies used, the overall acquisition or sale of durable and non-durable goods or intra-household decision-making between the two groups.
Using qualitative and quantitative data provides some insights into why there were differences in purchasing behavior and asset ownership between the two groups. Overall, voucher households were only able to purchase the goods available on the multisectoral and food voucher fairs on one day, which provided some limitations in terms of choice. This also meant that households were not able to save a portion of the transfer, unless they sold the voucher or goods purchased with the voucher.
Finally, while the value of the voucher was equivalent to the cash transfer, its market value might have been less, as voucher households had to purchase their goods at a “closed” voucher fair in Masisi Centre, with relatively higher transport costs to the camp and potentially higher prices, as traders were less willing to bargain.
The cash transfer program was cheaper, and more cost effective, for both Concern Worldwide and program recipients. The cash program cost $11.34 per program recipient, as compared with $14.35 per voucher recipient. In addition, despite the fact that both group of recipients had to travel to Masisi Centre to obtain their transfer, cash transfer recipients reported feeling safer than voucher recipients, as they could conceal the cash more easily along the Bushani-Masisi road. Since the benefits in the cash group were similar to, and slightly better than, those of the voucher group, cash transfers are preferred to vouchers from a cost effectiveness, efficiency and welfare perspective. Program recipients stated that they would prefer smaller cash transfers on a more regular basis, but still distributed in Masisi Centre to ensure security.