A ministerial-level open debate on peacekeeping and regional partnerships would be among the highlights of the Security Council’s work plan in July, Eugène-Richard Gasana ( Rwanda) said at a Headquarters press conference today.

Mr. Gasana, the organ’s incoming President, noted that Rwanda’s presidency of the Security Council this month was all the more “special” as the country celebrated its twentieth anniversary of liberation and marked the day when the Rwandan Patriotic Front took control of Kigali to stop the genocide.

On the work plan, he noted that discussion on peacekeeping and regional partnerships, scheduled for 28 July, would be chaired by Rwanda’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Louise Mushikiwabo. The “main briefer” for the event would be the Secretary-General, and he would be joined by the Chair of the African Union Commission and European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

On Tuesday, 15 July, the Council would hear a briefing on post-conflict peacekeeping by the Permanent Representative of Croatia, who would present the Peacebuilding Commission’s 2013 report in his capacity as its former Chair. That would be followed by an informal interactive dialogue between Council members, Configuration Chairs, and the President and Vice-President of the Commission, as well as the Chair of its working group on lessons learned.

The Council also would work on Africa-related issues, he said, meeting on the United Nations Office for West Africa on 8 July, and on 10 July, for a formal briefing by Lithuania’s Permanent Representative in connection with the “2127” committee. Also that day, the Permanent Representative of the Republic Korea would brief in consultations on the “751/1907” committee on Somalia and Eritrea. Consultations would be held on 16 July on the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), as well as on the situation in Sudan and South Sudan. On the following day, Tarek Mitri, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), would brief the Council.

Regarding the Middle East, he said the quarterly open debate was scheduled for 22 July, with a briefing by Robert Serry, Special Coordinator for the region. Closed consultations would be held on Syria, first on 7 July in relation to chemical weapons and then on 30 July on the humanitarian situation. Closed consultations were scheduled for 9 July on the “1701” report concerning Lebanon.

The Council would also consider the United Nations presence in Iraq and Cyprus, adopting a resolution on each in public meetings on 30 July. A formal meeting on 23 July would hear a briefing on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), followed by consultations with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative. The Cyprus situation also would be considered on 23 July in a closed meeting with troop contributors, followed on 24 July by consultations.

As in April 2013, the last time Rwanda held the Council presidency, the delegation, he said, would convene a public wrap-up session at month’s end. That format was intended to give the wider United Nations membership and the public a better “grasp [of] the dynamics in the Security Council, at least, during July”. The monthly programme covered the “main conflicts of the moment”, he added, promising to interact with the press as much as possible.

Responding to a series of questions concerning cross-border fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as well as a “letter of complaint” from his delegation last month regarding a travel waiver for a leader of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda — known as FDLR — he said he would not go into details as Council President. However, speaking in his national capacity, he added that everybody knew the FDLR was a “sanctioned entity” about which the Council had adopted several resolutions demanding its disarmament. There also was a resolution mandating the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the intervention force brigade to neutralize all armed groups in the eastern part of that country, including the FDLR.

Further speaking in his national capacity, he said that MONUSCO “is inefficient” and “should deliver properly, but it was not doing that”. He was prepared to discuss the situation with the media in a “bilateral context”, as he did not wish to “misuse” his current position.

Concerning Syria, he was waiting to hear from Luxembourg, Austria and Jordan about a possible resolution on the humanitarian situation there.

To questions concerning the “impasse” on the peacekeeping budget, he hoped there would be a “very fair outcome” and “very soon”.

What he was hearing about Iraq, he replied to additional questions, was “very scary”. There were consultations on 23 July and as for any change in the composition of UNAMI, he said developments were unfolding. He added that the Secretary-General’s Special Representative might come to brief the Council.

Replying to questions concerning the International Criminal Court, he expressed his openness to “hear those questions in his national capacity”. Asked about a possible draft presidential statement of the Russian Federation concerning oil exports and the Syrian situation, he said experts had met on that yesterday, adding “we’re working on that”.

Concerning why the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was not in the footnotes, he said it was, in connection with the item on non-proliferation. To a question on South Sudan, he said the Council was keeping an eye on the situation and might soon receive a report on that. Concerning the “crisis” of migrants trying to reach the Italian coast from Africa, it was not on the Council’s programme and thus he could not “promise anything”.

To queries about Security Council reform, he said, in his national capacity, that it was a long-term process, and added that “yes, Africa needs seats”; more than two thirds of the topics in the Council concerned Africa and he wished one day the continent’s representation in the Council would reflect that.

For information media • not an official record

Apparent Ethnic Attack Kills 30 Civilians

(Goma) – Congolese forces and United Nations peacekeepers failed to intervene to stop a nearby attack that killed at least 30 civilians. The attack was in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s South Kivu province on June 6, 2014.

Human Rights Watch research found that a senior Congolese army officer stationed nearby, who had been repeatedly warned and informed of the attack by armed assailants in the village of Mutarule, did not act to stop the killings. Members of the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, MONUSCO, based 9 kilometers away, were also aware of the attack but did not intervene, and only visited Mutarule two days after the massacre.

“The Congolese army and UN peacekeepers left civilians in Mutarule to be slaughtered even though they got desperate calls for help when the attack began,” said Anneke Van Woudenberg, Africa advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “Both the army and MONUSCO need to determine what went wrong and make sure such atrocities don’t happen again on their watch.”

Congolese military authorities opened an investigation into the attack and arrested two army officers and a civilian, but have not yet charged them. None of the attackers has been arrested.

The massacre occurred amid rising tensions between the Bafuliro and the Barundi and Banyamulenge ethnic groups. During a week-long Human Rights Watch research mission in and around Mutarule in mid-June, victims and witnesses described how a group of armed assailants, some of whom wore military uniforms and spoke Kirundi and Kinyamulenge – the languages of the Barundi and Banyamulenge – attacked an outdoor church service in the Bafuliro section of Mutarule.

The assailants opened fire on nearly 200 people who were gathered outside the church between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m. As people ran for cover, some were hit by gunfire or grenade shrapnel. The assailants then entered the worship area and started shooting people. They also targeted a health center and several houses, shot people at point-blank range, and then burned them to death. The victims included men, women, and at least eight children – among them a 4-year-old boy with mental and physical disabilities who was burned to death. Most of those killed were from the Bafuliro ethnic group.

One woman, who hid during the attack but was found by the assailants, told Human Rights Watch: “I said to them: ‘Please don’t kill me. I’m an old woman. What can I do to you?’ One said: ‘Bring the flashlight.’ When they brought it, another said: ‘What sort of old woman is this? Kill her.’ Then one of them took the bayonet on his gun and stabbed me here [in my ribs and breast].”

The South Kivu military prosecutor opened an investigation into the massacre on June 10. In the following two weeks, several provincial and national government officials visited Mutarule and surrounding areas to investigate the attack and show their support and solidarity with the victims and survivors. Human Rights Watch urged Congolese judicial authorities to bring the assailants responsible for the massacre to justice promptly, in accordance with international fair trial standards.

“Allegations that soldiers close to the scene of the massacre were given direct orders not to intervene raises serious questions about the military’s response to the attack,” Van Woudenberg said. “The military should investigate whether officers deliberately blocked efforts to protect civilians under attack and hold all those responsible to account.”

Residents of the village repeatedly called MONUSCO peacekeepers as the attack was going on. They then set up a small, temporary base on the outskirts of the village. In the ensuing two weeks, the MONUSCO force commander, Gen. Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, and the UN special representative for the secretary-general in Congo, Martin Kobler, visited Mutarule and surrounding areas. MONUSCO issued a news release on June 7, condemning the attack and saying that peacekeepers would take measures to protect the local population in Mutarule. Maj. Mohammed Shaban, the Pakistani commander of the MONUSCO peacekeepers’ base in Sange, 9 kilometers from Mutarule, was replaced by a new commander on June 22.

“UN peacekeepers are providing a false sense of security if they don’t even respond when the local protection committees they helped set up ring the alarm bell,” Van Woudenberg said. “Continuing tensions and the risk of further attacks mean that the UN should take immediate action to uncover what went wrong at Mutarule and make sure that UN commanders have the authority to respond quickly to any new threats.”

Tensions between the Bafuliro and Barundi and Banyamulenge remain high in the aftermath of the massacre. An anonymous flyer written in Swahili and distributed on June 16 in Uvira, the main town south of Mutarule, suggested that the Bafuliro would be taking the law into their own hands. It said: For any person found transporting Banyamulenge, “whether by bicycle, motorcycle, or in his car, it’s finished; he and his client will be burned together.”

Accounts of Victims, Witnesses

Human Rights Watch spoke to many witnesses who survived the attack in Mutarule. A 23-year-old woman who was outside in the church worship area when the attack started told Human Rights Watch:

We heard bullets coming from all sides. We all got down on the ground. They came in by the door and were in camouflage military uniforms. There were many of them. The first one said: “Exterminate them.” He said this in Kirundi. Then they started shooting. Next to me was a human rights activist named Akili. He was shot and died immediately. My sister was shot in the leg and injured. We lay on the ground and pretended we were dead.

Photographs taken after the attack, viewed by Human Rights Watch, showed a girl whose stomach was lacerated and children burned beyond recognition. Human Rights Watch researchers visited the communal gravesite of the 30 civilians who were killed. The researchers found AK-47 caliber bullet casings at the scene of the attack, as well as the burned remains of at least 12 homes.

A 28-year-old pregnant woman who was injured during the attack told Human Rights Watch how she hid in her house after the attack started:

When the assailants came into our house, they said: “Today we are going to kill you.” I asked: “Can you forgive us?” They said: “No, we aren’t going to forgive you. We are going to kill you.” Then they started to stab us. They stabbed me, as well as other women who were in the house with me. Afterward, they went into our neighbor’s house where they killed a father, a mother, and their children.

An elderly woman who was injured during the attack told Human Rights Watch:

During the shooting, I hid in a corner with my head under the dry banana leaves, but my feet were visible. I felt someone pulling at my feet. I told them I would get up. When I was up, I said to them: “Please don’t kill me. I’m an old woman. What can I do to you?” One said: “Bring the flashlight.” When they brought it, another said: “What sort of old woman is this? Kill her.” I heard another voice say in Kirundi: “Shoot her.”’ Then one of them took the bayonet on his gun and stabbed me here [in my ribs and breast].

Lead-up to the Massacre

Tensions had been mounting in recent months between ethnic Bafuliro, Barundi, and Banyamulenge in Mutarule and surrounding areas. The Bafuliro are seen by many to be an indigenous group, native to the region. The Barundi are related to the people of neighboring Burundi, and have lived in South Kivu since at least the early 19th century. The Banyamulenge, ethnic Tutsi who live in South Kivu, speak a language that is close to the languages of Rwanda and Burundi.

The Barundi and Bafuliro have disputed control of the customary chiefdom in the Ruzizi plain for several decades. While the current customary chief is from the Barundi ethnic group, the Bafuliro believe the customary power belongs to them. The conflict intensified on April 25, 2012, when unidentified gunmen killed Floribert Nsabimana Ndabagoye, the Barundi customary chief, in Mutarule, leading to a series of tit-for-tat attacks and cattle thefts.

Banyamulenge leaders, who are often allied with the Barundi, alleged that Bafuliro Mai Mai fighters had killed four Banyamulenge cattle herders since February 2013. The Mai Mai are local armed groups often organized to defend a particular ethnic group. In March and April 2014, two Banyamulenge herders were reported missing, one near Mutarule, the other in Bwegera, a village 15 kilometers away. Some local residents suspected the Bafuliro were behind their abduction. In what is widely believed to be a Banyamulenge revenge attack, two Bafuliro cattle herders were killed on April 12. Since then, approximately 400 Bafuliro households have left Bwegera, only returning to their farms during the day.

Army’s Failure to Respond

On June 6, before the attack, a Bafuliro armed group known as Mai Mai Bede, under the command of Bede Rusagara, an army deserter, allegedly killed a Banyamulenge cattle herder near Mutarule and stole his cattle.

A cattle rancher and youth leader of the Barundi ethnic group, Raymond Sheria, phoned Capt. Enabombi Changa Dejeune of the 10052 army battalion, based in Mutarule, and told him that cattle belonging to the Barundi had been stolen. Captain Enabombi sent soldiers to investigate the claim, but the troops came under fire from both Bafuliro Mai Mai and Banyamulenge and Barundi youth. When Enabombi called his commanding officer, 10052 interim battalion commander Col. Venance Kayumba Nyenyeri – himself from the Banyamulenge community – Nyenyeri told the captain to pull his troops back to his command post in Mutarule. Colonel Nyenyeri allegedly told the captain he should let the Mai Mai and Barundi fight it out themselves and that the army’s intervention could result in civilian casualties.

The fighting continued until around 6 p.m. Captain Enabombi continued to call Colonel Nyenyeri, who told him again not to intervene. Around 8 p.m., Sheria, the youth leader of the Barundi, called Enabombi. A soldier present at the time told Human Rights Watch that Sheria taunted the captain, saying that even though Sheria was a civilian, he would show Enabombi who was more of a soldier. The soldier said Sheria also said that he was going to commit a “memorable” act in Mutarule that no one would forget.

Around 9 p.m., when Enabombi heard gunfire in Mutarule, he called Nyenyeri again. The soldier who overheard the phone call said Nyenyeri promised to call the Barundi and “ask them to stop.”

Soon after, the attackers fired on Enabombi’s troops, who were protecting civilians who had sought shelter near their base. The troops returned fire. A soldier who was involved in the shoot-out told Human Rights Watch:

We tried with the means we had despite the orders that we were given not to intervene. We stopped because we didn’t have any more ammunition. The little we were able to do was thanks to 250 bullets we received from the police commander based there.

Enabombi again alerted Colonel Nyenyeri, as well as the deputy battalion commander, that attackers were burning houses and killing people. Nyenyeri allegedly told him he would bring ammunition and to wait at his command post while he consulted with the regiment commander, but never gave him any further instructions. Enabombi called Nyenyeri again multiple times, but the soldier who was present at the time said Nyenyeri did not always answer his phone.

Enabombi also called the military’s 104 sector commander and MONUSCO and alerted them to the attack. An army officer in Uvira who was alerted about the attack told Human Rights Watch that he had repeatedly tried to call Nyenyeri, but that his phone was turned off all night.

UN’s Failure to Respond

Major Shaban, the Pakistani commander of the MONUSCO peacekeepers’ base in Sange, told Human Rights Watch that the peacekeepers had been alerted to the killings in Mutarule on the evening of June 6, after the attack was under way. He said that when he called his superiors, they told him to clarify the situation and gather more information.

Local residents made multiple calls to MONUSCO pleading for help, from about 8:30 p.m. as the attack began.

Major Shaban told Human Rights Watch he had contacted the battalion commander, Nyenyeri, who said he would “sort it out.” Shaban said that, “We were very confident that if [gun]fire is going on, [the Congolese army] would be able to handle it.”

Following a previous attack in Mutarule in August 2013, when unidentified gunmen killed eight civilians, as well as ongoing insecurity in the region, Shaban said MONUSCO had set up local protection committees in early 2014 in Mutarule and neighboring villages to enable civilians to alert them to attacks or other threats. MONUSCO also distributed phones to allow community leaders to call MONUSCO without charge.

Une attaque à caractère apparemment ethnique a tué 30 civils

(Goma, le 3 juillet 2014) – Les forces congolaises et les forces de maintien de la paix de l’ONU ne sont pas intervenues pour arrêter une attaque se déroulant à proximité qui a tué au moins 30 civils. L'attaque s’est produite le 6 juin 2014, dans la province du Sud-Kivu, dans l’est de la République démocratique du Congo.

Les recherches de Human Rights Watch ont révélé qu’un officier supérieur de l'armée congolaise en poste à proximité, qui avait été averti à plusieurs reprises et informé de l'attaque menée par des assaillants armés dans le village de Mutarule, n'a pas agi pour arrêter le massacre. Les membres de la mission de maintien de la paix de l'ONU au Congo, la MONUSCO, basée à 9 kilomètres de là, étaient également au courant de l'attaque, mais ne sont pas intervenus et ne se sont rendus à Mutarule que deux jours après le massacre.

« L'armée congolaise et les forces de maintien de la paix de l'ONU ont laissé les civils de Mutarule se faire massacrer, bien qu’ils aient reçu des appels à l'aide désespérés dès le début de l’attaque », a déclaré Anneke Van Woudenberg, directrice de plaidoyer au sein de la divison Afrique à Human Rights Watch. « L'armée et la MONUSCO doivent déterminer quels ont été les dysfonctionnements et s'assurer que de telles atrocités ne se reproduisent pas, alors qu’elle sont censées veiller à la sécurité de la population. »

Les autorités militaires congolaises ont ouvert une enquête sur l'attaque et ont arrêté deux officiers de l'armée ainsi qu’un civil, mais elles ne les ont pas encore mis en accusation. Aucun des assaillants n'a été arrêté.

Le massacre a eu lieu dans un contexte de tensions croissantes entre les groupes ethniques bafuliro, barundi et banyamulenge. Au cours d'une mission de recherche menée par Human Rights Watch pendant une semaine à Mutarule et dans ses environs à la mi-juin, des victimes et des témoins ont décrit comment un groupe d'assaillants armés, dont certains portaient des uniformes militaires et parlaient kirundi et kinyamulenge – les langues des Barundis et des Banyamulenges – ont attaqué les participants à un service religieux qui se déroulait en plein air dans la partie bafuliro de Mutarule.

Les assaillants ont ouvert le feu sur près de 200 personnes qui étaient réunies à l’extérieur d’une église entre 20 heures et 21 heures. Alors que les personnes couraient pour tenter de se protéger, certaines ont été frappées par des tirs ou des éclats de grenade. Les assaillants ont alors fait irruption dans le lieu de culte, et ont commencé à tirer sur la foule. Ils ont également pris pour cible un centre de santé et plusieurs maisons, abattu des personnes à bout portant, puis les ont brûlées. Parmi les victimes figuraient des hommes, des femmes et au moins huit enfants – dont un garçon de 4 ans handicapé physique et mental qui est décédé des brûlures subies. La plupart des personnes tuées étaient des Bafuliros.

Une femme, qui s’est cachée pendant l'attaque mais a été découverte par les assaillants, a déclaré à Human Rights Watch : « Je leur ai dit : ‘S'il vous plaît, ne me tuez pas. Je suis une vieille femme. Qu’est-ce que je peux faire contre vous ?’ L’un d’eux a dit : ‘Apportez la lampe torche.’ Quand ils l'ont amenée, un autre a dit : ‘C’est quelle sorte de vieille femme ? Tuez-la.’ Puis, l'un d'eux a pris la baïonnette de son fusil et m'a poignardée ici [dans les côtes et le sein ]. »

L’auditeur militaire du Sud-Kivu a ouvert une enquête sur le massacre le 10 juin. Au cours des deux semaines suivantes, plusieurs autorités gouvernementales provinciales et nationales se sont rendues à Mutarule et aux environs pour enquêter sur l'attaque, et pour montrer leur soutien et leur solidarité avec les victimes et les survivants. Human Rights Watch a exhorté les autorités judiciaires congolaises à traduire en justice sans délai les agresseurs responsables du massacre, conformément aux normes internationales de procès équitables.

« Les allégations selon lesquelles les militaires se trouvant à proximité du site du massacre auraient reçu l’ordre direct de ne pas intervenir soulèvent de sérieuses questions sur la réponse de l'armée à l'attaque », a déclaré Anneke Van Woudenberg. « L’armée devrait déterminer si les officiers ont délibérément entravé les efforts visant à protéger les civils contre l’attaque, et exiger que tous les responsables rendent des comptes. »

Les habitants du village ont appelé à plusieurs reprises les forces de maintien de la paix de la MONUSCO lors de l’attaque. Ils ont ensuite mis en place une petite base temporaire à la périphérie du village. Dans les deux semaines qui ont suivi, le commandant des forces de la MONUSCO, le Général Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz, et le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général de l'ONU en RD Congo, Martin Kobler, se sont rendus à Mutarule et dans les environs du village. La MONUSCO a publié un communiqué le 7 juin, condamnant l'attaque en affirmant que les Casques bleus prendraient des mesures pour protéger la population locale à Mutarule. Le major Mohammed Shaban, commandant pakistanais de la base des Casques bleus de la MONUSCO à Sange, à 9 kilomètres de Mutarule, a été remplacé par un nouveau commandant le 22 juin.

« Les Casques bleus de l’ONU fournissent un faux sentiment de sécurité s’ils ne répondent même pas quand les comités de protection locaux qu'ils ont aidé à mettre en place tirent la sonnette d'alarme », a conclu Anneke Van Woudenberg. « Les tensions persistantes et le risque de nouvelles attaques signifient que l'ONU devrait prendre des mesures immédiates afin d’établir ce qui a mal fonctionné à Mutarule, et s’assurer que les commandants de l'ONU aient le pouvoir de répondre rapidement à de nouvelles menaces. »

Les tensions entre les Bafuliros, les Barundis et les Banyamulenges restent élevées à la suite du massacre. Un tract anonyme écrit en swahili et distribué le 16 juin à Uvira, la ville principale au sud de Mutarule, a suggéré que les Bafuliros rendraient la justice eux-mêmes. Ce tract avertissait au sujet de toute personne attrapée en train de transporter des Banyamulenges, « que ce soit à vélo, à moto, ou dans sa voiture, c'est fini ; cette personne et son client seront brûlés ensemble ».

Récits de victimes et de témoins

Human Rights Watch s’est entretenu avec de nombreux témoins qui ont survécu à l'attaque de Mutarule. Une femme de 23 ans, qui se trouvait à l'extérieur dans la zone de culte de l'église lorsque l'attaque a commencé, a déclaré à Human Rights Watch :

Nous avons entendu des balles venant de tous les côtés. Nous nous sommes tous allongés par terre. Ils sont entrés par la porte et ils portaient des uniformes militaires de camouflage. Ils étaient nombreux. Le premier a dit: « Exterminez-les. » Il l’a dit en kirundi. Puis ils ont commencé à tirer. Il y avait un militant des droits humains nommé Akili à côté de moi. Il a été touché et il est mort sur le coup. Ma sœur a reçu un tir dans la jambe et été blessée. Nous sommes restés couchés par terre et avons fait semblant d’être morts.

Des photos prises après l'attaque, vues par Human Rights Watch, montrent une jeune fille dont le ventre était lacéré et des enfants brûlés au point d’être méconnaissables. Les chercheurs de Human Rights Watch se sont rendus à la fosse commune des 30 civils qui ont été tués. Les chercheurs ont trouvé des douilles de calibre AK-47 sur les lieux de l'attaque, ainsi que les décombres incendiés d'au moins 12 maisons.

Une femme enceinte âgée de 28 ans qui a été blessée lors de l'attaque a confié à Human Rights Watch comment elle s’est cachée dans sa maison après le début de l'attaque:

Quand les assaillants sont entrés dans notre maison, ils ont dit : « Aujourd'hui, nous allons vous tuer. » J'ai demandé : « Pouvez-vous nous pardonner ? » Ils ont répondu : « Non, nous n'allons pas vous pardonner. Nous allons vous tuer. » Puis ils ont commencé à nous poignarder. Ils m'ont poignardée ainsi que d'autres femmes qui étaient dans la maison avec moi. Ensuite, ils sont allés dans la maison de notre voisin où ils ont tué un père, une mère et leurs enfants.

Une femme âgée qui a été blessée lors de l'attaque a confié à Human Rights Watch :

Pendant la fusillade, je me suis cachée dans un coin, la tête sous les feuilles sèches de bananier, mais mes pieds étaient visibles. J'ai senti que quelqu'un me tirait par les pieds. Je leur ai dit que j’allais me lever. Une fois debout, je leur ai dit : « S'il vous plaît, ne me tuez pas. Je suis une vieille femme. Qu’est-ce que je peux faire contre vous ? » L’un d’eux a dit : « Apportez la lampe torche ». Quand ils l’ont apportée, un autre a dit : « C’est quelle sorte de vieille femme ? Tuez-la. » Puis, l’un d’eux a pris la baïonnette de son fusil et m'a poignardée ici [dans les côtes et le sein].

Prélude au massacre

Les tensions s’étaient aggravées ces derniers mois entre les groupes ethniques bafuliro, barundi et banyamulenge à Mutarule et ses environs. Les Bafuliros sont considérés par un grand nombre de personnes comme un groupe autochtone, originaire de la région. Les Barundis sont liés au peuple du Burundi voisin et ont vécu dans le Sud-Kivu depuis au moins le début du 19e siècle. Les Banyamulenges, des Tutsis qui vivent dans le Sud-Kivu, parlent une langue qui est proche de celles du Rwanda et du Burundi.

Les Barundis et les Bafuliros se sont disputé le contrôle de la chefferie coutumière dans la plaine de la Ruzizi depuis plusieurs décennies. Alors que le chef coutumier actuel appartient à l’ethnie barundi, les Bafuliros estiment que le pouvoir coutumier leur appartient. Le conflit s'est intensifié le 25 avril 2012, lorsque des hommes armés non identifiés ont tué Floribert Nsabimana Ndabagoye, le chef coutumier des Barundis, à Mutarule, menant à une série d’attaques de représailles et de vols de bétail.

Les dirigeants banyamulenge, qui sont souvent alliés avec les Barundis, ont affirmé que des combattants Maï Maï bafuliro avaient tué quatre éleveurs de bétail banyamulenge depuis février 2013. Les Maï Maï sont des groupes armés locaux souvent organisés pour défendre un groupe ethnique donné. En mars et avril 2014, deux éleveurs banyamulenge ont été portés disparus, l'un près de Mutarule, l'autre à Bwegera, un village distant de 15 kilomètres. Certains résidents locaux ont soupçonné que les Bafuliros étaient à l’origine de leur enlèvement. Lors de ce qui est largement considéré comme une attaque menée par les Banyamulenges en guise de représailles, deux éleveurs de bétail bafuliro ont été tués le 12 avril. Depuis lors, environ 400 ménages bafuliro ont quitté Bwegera, ne revenant à leurs champs que pendant la journée.

Absence de réponse de l’armée

Le 6 juin, avant l'attaque, un groupe armé bafuliro connu sous le nom de Maï Maï Bede, sous le commandement de Bede Rusagara, un déserteur de l'armée, aurait tué un éleveur de l’ethnie banyamulenge près de Mutarule et volé son bétail.

Un éleveur de bétail et dirigeant des jeunes de l’ethnie barundi, Raymond Sheria, a téléphoné au capitaine Enabombi Changa Dejeune du bataillon 10052 de l'armée, basé à Mutarule, et lui a annoncé que des vaches appartenant aux Barundis avaient été volés. Le Capitaine Enabombi a envoyé des soldats pour enquêter sur cette réclamation, mais les troupes ont essuyé des tirs à la fois des Maï Maï bafuliro et des jeunes banyamulenge et barundi. Lorsqu’Enabombi a appelé son commandant, le colonel Kayumba Venance Nyenyeri, commandant intérimaire du bataillon 10052, issu lui-même de la communauté banyamulenge, celui-ci a ordonné au capitaine de retirer ses éléments à son poste de commandement à Mutarule. Le Colonel Nyenyeri aurait dit au capitaine qu’il devrait laisser les Maï Maï et les Barundis se battre entre eux et que l'intervention de l'armée pourrait entraîner des pertes civiles.

Les combats se sont poursuivis jusque vers 18 heures. Le capitaine Enabombi a continué d’appeler le colonel Nyenyeri, qui lui a répété de ne pas intervenir. Aux environs de 20 heures, Sheria, le leader des jeunes barundis, a appelé Enabombi. Un soldat présent à ce moment-là a indiqué à Human Rights Watch que Sheria s’est moqué du capitaine, en disant que même si Sheria était un civil, il montrerait à Enabombi qu’il est plus militaire que lui. Le soldat a affirmé que Sheria a également dit qu'il allait commettre à Mutarule un acte « mémorable » que personne n'oublierait.

Aux environs de 21 heures, lorsque Enabombi a entendu des coups de feu à Mutarule, il a de nouveau appelé Nyenyeri. Le soldat qui a entendu l'appel téléphonique a affirmé que Nyenyeri a promis d'appeler les Barundis et de « leur demander d'arrêter. »

Peu de temps après, les assaillants ont tiré sur les éléments d’Enabombi, qui protégeaient les civils ayant cherché refuge à proximité de leur base. Ses éléments ont riposté. Un soldat ayant participé à la fusillade a déclaré à Human Rights Watch :

On a essayé avec les moyens qu’on avait, malgré les ordres qu’on nous a donnés de ne pas intervenir. On s’est arrêtés parce qu’on n’avait plus de munitions. Le peu qu’on a pu faire, c’était grâce à 250 balles reçues de la part du commandant de la police basé sur place.

Enabombi a de nouveau alerté le colonel Nyenyeri, ainsi que le commandant adjoint du bataillon, sur le fait que des assaillants étaient en train d’incendier des maisons et de tuer des gens. Nyenyeri lui aurait dit qu'il allait apporter des munitions et d'attendre à son poste de commandement tandis qu'il consultait le commandant de régiment, mais il ne lui a jamais donné d'autres instructions. Enabombi a de nouveau appelé Nyenyeri à plusieurs reprises, mais le soldat qui était présent à ce moment-là a indiqué que Nyenyeri ne répondait pas toujours à son téléphone.

Enabombi a également appelé le commandant du secteur 104 de l'armée et la MONUSCO, et les a alertés au sujet de l'attaque. Un officier de l'armée à Uvira qui a été alerté à propos de l'attaque a affirmé à Human Rights Watch qu'il avait à plusieurs reprises essayé d'appeler Nyenyeri, mais que son téléphone était éteint toute la nuit.

Absence de réponse de la part de l’ONU

Le Major Shaban, commandant pakistanais de la base des forces de maintien de la paix de la MONUSCO à Sange, a déclaré à Human Rights Watch que les Casques bleus avaient été prévenus des meurtres se déroulant à Mutarule le soir du 6 juin, après que l'attaque ait commencé. Il a affirmé que lorsqu’il a appelé ses supérieurs, ceux-ci lui ont ordonné de clarifier la situation et de recueillir davantage d'informations.

Des résidents locaux ont appelé la MONUSCO à plusieurs reprises en les suppliant de leur venir en aide, à partir de 20h30 environ lorsque l'attaque a commencé.

Le Major Shaban a déclaré à Human Rights Watch qu'il avait contacté le commandant du bataillon, Nyenyeri, qui a dit qu'il allait « s’en occuper ». Shaban a déclaré : « Nous étions très confiants que s’il y avait des tirs, [l'armée congolaise] serait en mesure de s’en occuper. »

Shaban a ajouté que suite à une précédente attaque perpétrée à Mutarule en août 2013, lorsque des hommes armés non identifiés ont tué huit civils, et en raison de l'insécurité continue dans la région, la MONUSCO avait mis en place des comités locaux de protection au début de 2014 à Mutarule et dans les villages voisins, afin de permettre aux civils de les prévenir de nouvelles attaques ou d'autres menaces. La MONUSCO a également distribué des téléphones de façon à permettre aux dirigeants de la communauté de l'appeler gratuitement.

Alert 2014! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding is a yearbook which analyzes the state of the world in connection with conflicts and peacebuilding based on four areas of analysis: armed conflicts, socio-political crises, peace processes and the gender dimension on peacebuilding. Focusing on these areas, Alert 2014! offers an overview of the world’s state of affairs and reveals possible trends and dynamics related to the characteristics and evolution of those areas. The comparison of the data with figures from previous years means the report can act as an early warning tool regarding general trends or situations in specific countries. This can be useful, among other things, to devise foreign policy, development cooperation and arms transfer policies, as well as policies to prevent armed conflicts and consolidate peace processes and post-war recovery.

HIGHLIGHTS

• Prospects for 2014 global cereal production improve further with upward revisions to coarse grains and wheat forecasts, contributing to an enhanced cereal supply outlook for 2014/15.

• International prices of wheat and maize dropped in June, reflecting favourable production prospects, while rice export quotations increased slightly. Cereal export prices were overall lower than their year earlier levels.

• In North Africa, an average cereal crop is forecast, with larger harvests expected in Algeria and Tunisia, while a decline is anticipated in Morocco.

• In the Central African Republic (CAR), continued civil insecurity has jeopardized crop production and the food situation of a large number of people is expected to deteriorate further.

• In Eastern Africa, continued and escalating conflicts in parts of South Sudan, the Sudan and Somalia, further exacerbated the food insecurity situation of vulnerable groups. Drier-than-normal weather conditions are also raising concerns for crop and livestock conditions.

• In Western Africa, in spite of adequate cereal supplies at the regional level following last year’s above average harvests, humanitarian assistance is still needed in several parts, due mostly to conflict related population displacements.

• In Southern Africa, cereal production is expected to recover significantly in 2014 compared to the drought-reduced crop of last year. Food prices have started to decline thus improving food access.

• In the Far East Asia, early prospects for the main season’s rice and coarse grains crops, currently being planted, are favourable. However, a considerable decline is forecast in Sri Lanka due to dry weather.

• In the Near East, adverse weather conditions and an escalation of conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq have negatively impacted on crop production and food security.

• In Central America, despite uncertainty regarding a possible El Niño occurrence, the current outlook for coarse grains production is positive.

• In South America, production prospects for coarse grains are favourable, despite an expected decline in maize production from last year’s record level. Wheat production is forecast to recover strongly from its two-year low, as sowings increased significantly in response to high prices.

• FAO estimates that globally 33 countries, including 26 countries in Africa, are in need of external assitance for food due to conflict, crop failures and high domestic food prices or a combination of them.

• FAO is closely monitoring the development of a possible El Niño event, which could have implications on global cereal production. Latest forecasts indicate a 70 percent probability of an occurrence during the Northern Hemisphere’s summer.

HIGHLIGHTS

• Age 15: the ICCs criminal threshold

• Greater awareness of child recruitment post Lubanga

• Focus on individualized care for ex-child soldiers

• Reintegration difficult, takes time

THE HAGUE/BUNIA, 3 July 2014 (IRIN) - Recent high profile moves against militia commanders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have done little to stem child recruitment into armed groups, and much more needs to be done to prevent it, stop re-recruitment, and rehabilitate victims.

On 9 June, the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity against former Congolese general Bosco Ntaganda, including the “enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities”.

The case of Ntaganda follows the successful prosecution of Thomas Lubanga in 2012, who was found guilty of conscripting child soldiers in northeastern DRC.

By 2011, the World Bank found that more than 30,000 Congolese child soldiers had been officially demobilized from the ranks of armed groups and reunited with their families after being engaged in the conflict in DRC.

Since 1996 the practice of recruiting children under the age of 15, the ICC’s criminal age threshold, from eastern and central parts of the DRC, has become a systematic and widespread process carried out by all fighting fractions.

Despite ongoing efforts by the international community to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate child soldiers, a recent report of the UN Stabilization Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) revealed that between 2012 and 2013 alone, nearly 1,000 children had been recruited by military groups fighting particularly in the provinces of North and South Kivu in eastern DRC.

A former commander of a Mai-Mai militia, operating in the North and South Kivu provinces, told Donatien Nduwimana, the author of a 2013 study on reintegration of child soldiers: “Children are available as they have nothing else to do, they are extremely obedient to orders, they make few demands, which are easy to satisfy.”

As a result, armed groups developed sophisticated methods to reinforce their troops with minors. These children are forced to work as cooks, spies and soldiers fighting directly on the frontlines, and for purposes of sexual enslavement. Homes and schools, normally considered safe havens, became regular targets of military raids to abduct the children.

According to William Lifongo, child protection adviser and deputy chief of MONUSCO’s Child Protection Section, boys and girls “were persuaded to join. They joined because they were promised education; they were promised jobs; they were promised military rewards within the groups. Some of them said they joined because that was the way to protect themselves; they thought that this was a way of finding security around them.”

Lubanga verdict impact

Mariana Goetz, former deputy director of the British NGO Redress, noted that in DRC the use of children as part of the armed groups had become normalized, especially before the conviction of Lubanga.

“When one explained the concept of child recruitment, people were often confused. They obviously saw the crimes like pillaging, rape, murder as the main crimes. The child recruitment for them was seen like almost an obligation or right of the armed groups... The community had sent whatever they have got to support the war effort of their ethnic leader, and that would be a cow, or a child or whatever they had,” she told IRIN.

Luc Walleyn, legal representative in the Lubanga case at the ICC for 22 of the 133 victims, many of whom were children, explained that even some of his clients were not aware of the fact that their very recruitment was a crime under international criminal law.

“They felt that they were victims of criminal behaviour in the way they have been treated by commanders, as they were confronted with horrible conditions in the training camps and in the war situations,” said Walleyn.

Since the guilty verdict, however, there is more awareness of the crime of recruiting child soldiers. “The conviction serves more as a deterrent. Warlords are recruiting in hiding. They do everything not to display these children during visits to their strongholds,” Bumba Nicaise, executive secretary of human rights NGO Justice Plus, told IRIN. “I found that they’re fearful, because they’re aware of the prosecution.”

But attitudes towards Lubanga are complex in the country. Among certain communities, he is still treated as a local hero. Jason Msafiri, a local freelance journalist, estimates that more than 80 percent of the Hema community was looking forward to the release of Lubanga.

“They found him to be a liberator of the massacres committed by the Lendu. Plus, he educated the extremist elements to be more moderate,” Msafari told IRIN.

Why DDR failed in the past

The government has initiated a number of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes over the years, with limited success.

“A large number of current rebel fighters have been through demobilization programmes, only to be re-recruited by rebel groups. Many found no alternative livelihood. Their former leaders pressured them to re-join, or they were prompted to do so by continuing insecurity in their home areas,” noted a paper on Congolese armed groups published by the Rift Valley Institute and the Usalama Project.

Particularly for children, “the [National Commission for Demobilization and Reintegration - CONADER, established in 2004 and now defunct] programme hadn’t been able to adapt to the realities on the ground,” a UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) officer who preferred anonymity told IRIN. “NGOs haven’t been successful, and as a result we still have social problems like delinquency, banditry and child recruitment to armed groups.”

“DDR had three parts, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The failure that people talk about is in reintegration. And that’s the fault of the community and the state - communities do no properly supervise and monitor the demobilized, and the state does not ensure safety,” said Flory Kitoko, a former CONADER officer.

Reintegration woes

"Mechanisms for reintegration of children are getting better after the experiences of past failures," said Aimé Birido, coordinator of the NGO AJEDEC (Youth Association for Community Development) which looks after separated children in Orientale Province.

Early on in the DDR process, reintegration of children was being done in a similar manner to that of adults, with limited success, Birido noted.

But, since then, changes have been made to the way that DDR is conducted for children. In a review of its DRC programmes to protect children in emergencies published in August 2013, UNICEF said that since 2008, it has been able to provide “over 24,000 individualized packages of care, education and skills trainings for boys and girls released from the armed forces and armed groups”.

The study also noted that child recruitment numbers appear to be falling, and “the age of recruitment appears to have increased.”

“Reintegration is a long-term, kind of multi-dimensional process. It involves so many stakeholders - family, civil society, community, church, legal system, and donors,” said Buken Waruzi, senior programme manager for Africa and Middle East at NGO WITNESS. “It takes time for everyone in the community to understand that the identity of the child soldier should not be a criminalizing or a shameful identity.”

NGOs carrying out the reintegration process often have to negotiate with families to take back and accept their sons and daughters. However, “sometimes children are rejected by their own family,” said Tom Gillhespy, head of Africa programmes at NGO Peace Direct.

“They may be seen as bringing shame on the family, or sometimes the recruitment process required them to act violently towards people that they are knew in order to break their social ties. So a lot of the tactics used in militia recruitment can actually actively undermine their social reintegration,” he added.

No data, follow-ups

One of the main challenges in assessing the success of DDR programmes for children is the lack of available data about what happens once they have been reintegrated.

“Generally after the demobilization a lot of them are still in conflict with their own families. A lot of them are just street children. They are poor, jobless, homeless, working in some mines digging gold or riding a bike to make taxi services,” said Walleyn.

“Some of them are happily reintegrated. But those who are doing well, they are very few - maybe be 7-10 percent.” Even those who received education or vocational training struggle today to make their living, because after school there is nothing to do. They can’t find a job, they can’t find anything,” said Waruzi.

UNICEF acknowledged in its study that “gaps identified were the scarce information on recruited girls and poor documentation and analysis of follow-up after reintegration, hampering determination of longer term outcomes and the true extent of re-recruitment.”

Waruzi argued that the government needs to do more to offer long-term assistance to former child soldiers. “NGOs can collect grants here and there, but these grants will help only for few years,” he noted. “The reintegration is a lifetime process. Let's say a child came back from camp with HIV - can you intervene for only one, two, three years? It has to be for the entire life.”

no-rp/aps/cb

Faits saillants

Choléra dans la Plaine de la Ruzizi sous contrôle grâce aux interventions humanitaires.

Mouvements de population

Selon des sources locales, 250 personnes ont fui la localité de Bwegera dans la Plaine de la Ruzizi, Territoire d'Uvira, suite à une attaque armée à domicile le 26 juin, ayant coûté la vie d'une femme. Ces populations se seraient déplacées vers la localité de Luvungi. Des mouvements pendulaires entre Luvungi, Bwegera et Luberizi ont également été rapportés. Ces déplacements s'inscrivent dans un contexte d'insécurité et de tension entre les communautés Bafuliru, Banyamulenge et Barundi notamment suite à l'attaque de Mutarule du 6 juin. Les familles déplacées craignent de nouvelles attaques ou représailles contre leurs communautés et la priorité humanitaire demeure la protection des civils. Le conflit intercommunautaire dans la Plaine de la Ruzizi est à la base de nombreux mouvements forcés des populations. Plus de 3 500 personnes avaient fui Bwegera au mois de mars en raison de l'insécurité et environ 2 300 d'entre elles se trouvent toujours à Luvungi.

• Congo-based FDLR given breathing space to lay down weapons

• Group contains remnants responsible for Rwandan genocide

• Disarmament could boost stability in eastern Congo

By Shrikesh Laxmidas and Peter Jones

LUANDA/KINSHASA, July 3 (Reuters) - African nations have agreed to suspend military operations for six months against Congo-based Rwandan rebels in order to give them more time to lay down their arms, regional government officials said.

Read the full article here

GA/11528

Sixty-eighth General Assembly
Plenary
99th Meeting (Resumed*) (PM)

Delegates Welcome Key Text Raising
Troop Reimbursement Rates for First Time in Years

The General Assembly today acted on the recommendations of its Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary), adopting 24 resolutions and two decisions focused largely on a key aspect of the Capital Master Plan, a new staff mobility framework, enhanced reimbursements for police- and troop-contributing countries, and the Organization’s peacekeeping budgets.

Acting without a vote, the Assembly adopted draft resolutions on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (document A/C.5/68/L.43); special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives (L.42); and drafts I to IV concerning administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations, on, respectively, troop reimbursements (L.44), triennial review of the rates and standards for reimbursement to Member States for contingent-owned equipment (L.45), the support account for peacekeeping operations (L.46), and financing the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (L.47).

Following action on those texts, India’s representative noted that his country was among the largest troop contributors and underscored the importance of the text on reimbursements. It was the first time in 20 years that the rate had been revised upwards, he noted. The arduous negotiations had been firmly rooted in the acceptance by all delegations of the Senior Advisory Group’s report, he said, adding that they had nearly foundered on the “rocks and shoals” of the Fifth Committee. The effort to dismiss the report during the talks was “reprehensible”. The adoption of that resolution committed all States unequivocally to the manner in which troop reimbursements would be handled from now on, as both the report and resolution put an automatic and sound methodology in place, he said, adding that four years from now, successors should adopt a follow-on text without the “rancour or bitterness” that had accompanied the just-concluded negotiations. The figure of $1,762 per month for individual troops was based on the facts on the ground, he emphasized. The questioning to which it had been subjected did not detract from its justification, and India expected that the figure would be used as a baseline in future.

Economic difficulties notwithstanding, it had taken 18 long years for the upwards revision, he said. In that time, many had faced similar difficulties and austerity measures, which, however, had not deterred troop contributors when called upon by the United Nations. India hoped the next four years would see an economic upturn in the fortunes of the finance-contributing countries, he said, while cautioning against the use of that argument four years from now. He expressed concern over the increasing demands for human and financial resources on Member States occasioned by the “mushrooming of the operations” owing to volatile political situations. It was up to the General Assembly to advise the Security Council on how to make mandates more cost-effective, including through greater use of the Article IV of the United Nations Charter.

Pakistan’s representative said that despite the different perspectives, all sides had worked resolutely to explore common ground and keep peacekeeping partnerships “intact and strong”. What mattered at the end was that consensus had prevailed. In view of the increasing complexity and demands of peacekeeping operations, the “Group of 77” developing countries and China had long argued for increased reimbursements, he said, recalling that the rate had last been revised in 1992. Since then, it had remained a vexing issue both for the General Assembly and the United Nations as a whole.

Describing the revision as a step in the right direction, he said partners, as well as major finance contributors, had rightly insisted that any fruitful conversation on rate increases should take place in the face of the empirical evidence justifying it. A professional survey had been conducted on the basis of a scientific methodology, clearly recognizing $1,762.55 per month as the actual “weighted average cost” of troop contributors, he noted. That figure was “authentic and credible”, and should remain the parameter for the next four years. The revision and formal increase had broken new ground, despite divergences and constraints, he said, adding that despite the limited outcome, today’s decision was a “net gain” for peacekeeping and the Organization.

The Assembly then went on to adopt, without a vote, the United Nations peace presences in Abyei (L.48); Côte d’Ivoire (L.49); Cyprus (L.50); Democratic Republic of the Congo (L.51); Timor-Leste (L.38); Haiti (L.52); Kosovo (L.53); Liberia (L.54); Mali (L.55); and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) (L.56).

Syria’s representative said he had joined the consensus on the UNDOF text and would do the same in respect of the resolution on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the basis of the fact that Israel was “aggressing the occupied land” and, therefore, the two forces should be financed.

He said the Secretary-General’s report should be impartial and “unpoliticized”. For example, it did not mention Israel’s military activities in support of terrorist groups supporting Al-Qaida, he noted, adding that he had also been surprised to see in the report that the Damascus airport was closed. It had never been closed and was still operating “in the usual way”, he declared. He asked UNDOF to go back and use the airport, adding that the roads there were also safe. The Force had withdrawn from certain places, thereby “opening the ground” for attacks by terrorist groups supported by Israeli forces, he said, stressing that UNDOF should “immediately recover” its zone for the sake of security and stability.

The resolution on UNIFIL required a recorded vote and was adopted after a separate vote on its fourth preambular paragraph, as well as operative paragraphs 4, 5, and 13.

The Assembly then adopted, without a vote, texts on South Sudan (L.57); Sudan (L.40); Syria (L.37); Western Sahara (L.58); Darfur (L.59); the financing arising from Security Council resolution 1863 (2009) (L.60); and the Central African Republic (L.61).

It then adopted two draft decisions on review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (L.62), and another titled “Questions deferred for future consideration”.

Ken Siah ( Singapore), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee presented that body’s reports.

For details of the voting, see Press Release GA/AB/4116.

Before taking up the Fifth Committee’s reports, the Assembly allocated to that body, in accordance with the Secretary-General’s request, an item concerning the United Nations Staff Pensions Committee (document A/68/235, owing to the resignation of Bernard Kuntzel (Germany), effective 16 June.

In other business, the Assembly adopted a resolution on follow-up to and implementation of the outcome of the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development and the 2008 Review Conference (L.49), as well as a draft decision on follow-up to the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action (L.52).

The General Assembly will reconvene at a date to be announced.

*See Press Release GA/11527 of 30 June 2014.

For information media • not an official record

By Philippa Garson

HIGHLIGHTS

• New tools needed to analyse organized crime

• Criminal financing of state structures

• Weak states open door to crime

• Development-oriented solutions needed

NEW YORK, 3 July 2014 (IRIN) - Growing concern about the extent to which organized crime is undermining stability and prosperity on the African continent is galvanizing a search for analytical tools and a clamour for more research to understand the contextual forces at play and how best to undermine them.

Whereas debates on organized crime primarily centered on the developed world, and then on Latin America and Central Asia, the focus has shifted to Africa. “Where analysts once questioned the relevance of organized crime as an issue in Africa, it is now increasingly being perceived as a quintessentially African concern,” reads a report, Unholy Alliances: Organized Crime in Southern Africa, put out by the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime and Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, based on discussions by a panel of experts earlier this year. The report notes that of the growing number of mentions and resolutions made by the UN Security Council over the past eight years, 80 percent related to Africa.

Experts at the panel noted that there should be no “finger pointing” at the continent or its states and that “the most developed states in the world have roots in corruption and organized crime”. Furthermore, when trying to find solutions, “the role of Western countries and companies as exploiters and consumers in Africa must sit in the foreground.”

The focus on Africa has largely coincided with the accompanying realization over the last decade that not only does organized crime threaten development but that development-orientated solutions are necessary to combat it.

Organized crime on the continent is part of the “narrative of independence and statehood” reads the report. The end of the Cold War and reductions in development aid opened the space for criminal financing of state structures. Furthermore, “multi-party democracy and the need to finance electoral processes have presented a particularly vulnerable point for networks to gain influence and legitimacy.”

Growing demand in Asia and the Middle East for both licit and illicit goods has fuelled trade in Africa. “The burgeoning market for recreational drugs and wildlife products has caused criminal networks in Africa to grow and become increasingly professional and militarized. At the same time, demand for recreational drugs in the Gulf, coupled with instability across North Africa, has pulled trafficking flows eastwards,” reads the report. The rise in amphetamine use in emerging markets in the Gulf and Asia means that drug production is no longer confined to specific geographical areas. In southern Africa, weapons smuggling routes from the liberation wars are now being used to traffic wildlife products and other illicit goods.

Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime Mark Shaw says beyond a few examples such as the gangs of the Western Cape in South Africa, or patterns of organized crime in Nigeria, classic definitions of organized crime do not in his view apply to Africa. “It’s not something you can confine to a box that occurs separately from the state and commercial institutions. On the continent, organized crime is much more clearly linked to these institutions.”

“Protection economy”

Shaw invokes the notion of a “protection economy” to illustrate how the various players intersect in countries where the state’s capacity is weak. He identifies three key components that comprise a protection economy: firstly, provision of violence or “the people with guns” to secure the movement of contraband, which can vary from elements in the security forces themselves to militia, to gangs, to private security companies; secondly, corruption - involving payment to key government officials; thirdly, criminal investment in the communities themselves to ensure legitimacy and smooth operation, such as payment to political parties, or financing of local facilities.

“This is a better way to understand organized crime in a particular context where the state is weak or unable to offer protection. It allows you to look at the whole range of state, business, criminal and community actors and understand how they are interrelated,” adds Shaw, who believes that every major criminal network operating on the continent contains these three elements in varying degrees. Where the state is particularly weak “the protection economy is most pronounced,” he says.

While the protection economy phenomenon is hardly unique to Africa it is in evidence in many of its countries. The extent to which the state is involved varies across the spectrum. Guinea Bissau has seen full state involvement in the protection economy, while in Mali local players in organized crime have had links to the state. In Libya, where there are large swathes of ungoverned territory “protection is sold by private brokers, often with ties to certain militia.”

Where such overlaps between crime, state and politics occur, traditional law and order responses - such as seizure of contraband and locking up culprits (usually those at the lower levels) - won’t solve the problems, comments Stephen Ellis, researcher at the African Studies Center in Leiden, the Netherlands.

Blurring of frontiers between legitimate and illegitimate enterprise

He cites failed efforts to combat the drug trade in West Africa, as an example. There is a widespread sense among law and order contingents, he says, that they cannot adequately address organized crime because “they don’t have the right tools. The nature of the problem has changed but in ways that are not easy to understand,” he adds, noting a blurring of the frontiers between legitimate and illegitimate enterprise, particularly in so-called failed or failing states. “The notion of a ‘failed state’ is not a term I like,” adds Ellis, “because it does not necessarily correspond to what is happening on the ground.” However, it is a useful tool to identify those countries where the state does not have a monopoly on violence, he says. According to Foreign Policy’s index of 50 failed states, 32 are located in Africa.

“Many people involved in activities that are illegal may have a high level of legitimacy locally,” says Ellis. “They may be people who have played a formal role in politics, particularly in an era of one-party states.”

A recent report by the West African Commission on Drugs notes that “the work of traffickers in the region is facilitated by a wide range of people, which can include business executives, politicians, members of the security forces and the judiciary, clergymen, traditional leaders and youth.” Because elections are privately funded in most parts of this region, they are easily co-opted by drug money.

Examples of the involvement of the state and political actors in organized crime across the continent abound - from elephant poaching and ivory trade that implicates many countries, including Zimbabwe, Sudan, DRC, Tanzania, Mozambique; to diamond mining in Zimbabwe; to the arms deal in South Africa; to rhino horn trafficking (South Africa and Mozambique); to smuggling, arms and drugs trafficking in Libya and the Sahel; to trafficking of drugs and logging in Guinea Bissau; to trafficking of ivory, gold and diamonds in the Central African Republic. The list goes on.

Shaw believes that the “protection economy” tool allows one to “cost protection economies and to measure progress against them”. According to the Global Initiative report, “consideration of the protection economy and how it operates is an analytical tool that prompts the consideration of a broader spectrum of issues and actors, and thus arguably can increase the likelihood of improved interventions.” One can increase the protection costs of engaging in organized crime by making the risk of exposure greater through dogged media investigation, for example, says Shaw, or by helping communities become more resilient to penetration by crime groups through successful development initiatives.

A dangerous area for journalists

Investigating organized crime is easier said than done. Research by the Committee to Protect Journalists shows that 35 percent of all journalists killed since 1992 were covering organized crime and corruption, often more dangerous beats for journalists than covering conflict. Furthermore, when the “the lines between political and criminal groups are blurred in many nations” the risk for reporters goes up.

According to the CPJ, “criminal groups are operating increasingly like armed political forces, and armed political groups are operating increasingly as for-profit, criminal bands. Journalists have been attacked while reporting on collusion between crime figures and government officials, and they have been targeted while pursuing crime or corruption stories during times of both peace and war.”

Increasingly, development actors are being forced to engage with the phenomenon of organized crime as they recognize the extent to which it is enmeshed in all levels of society and feeds off poor communities, subverting development agendas. In the Sahel, for example, communities rely on the proceeds of organized crime, in the same way as those in Somalia came to depend on the proceeds of piracy, or the villagers in Mozambique on the money from rhino horn poaching. Without alternatives, poor communities will continue to be the foot soldiers of organized crime.

A recent Safer World report, Identifying approaches and measuring impacts of programs focused on Transnational Organized Crime describes transnational organized crime (TOC) as fast becoming a key development issue and notes an increase in developmental approaches to tackling it. “TOC is largely driven by the demand for illicit goods in rich, developed nations. However, the impacts are felt most keenly by communities in poorer countries with weak institutions.” According to the report, the “existence of linkages between the various levels of the system within which TOC operates also suggest that holistic strategies which draw on different approaches are likely to have a higher impact.”

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