Les habitants de cinq localités du territoire de Faradje, à plus de 800 Km au Nord-Est de Kisangani (Province Orientale) ont quitté leurs villages pour se refugier dans les localités voisines. Ils ont fui des incursions à répétition des hommes en armes identifiés à la rébellion ougandaise de la LRA depuis fin mars, a indiqué le commissaire du district du Haut-Uélé, Dieudonné Rwabona, ce lundi 8 avril.

Selon le président de la société civile locale de Watsa qui revient de Faradje, ces hommes en armes sont venus de la République centrafricaine fuyant les combattants Seleka, aujourd’hui au pouvoir en RCA.

Les villages Kudjukuwa, Lidjo, Takiani, Nganzi, et Ngbalanda se sont vidés de leurs habitants. Les habitants de Kudjuwa, Lidjo et Takiani se sont retirés à Faradje-centre et ceux de Nganzi et Ngbalanda, au poste d’Etat de Djabir.

A Faradje, selon lui, ces assaillants ont pillé les maisons, les greniers, les bétails et volailles ainsi que les boutiques sans être inquiétés.

La brigade régionale constituée des militaires du soudan, de l’Ouganda et de la RDC est déjà à la recherche des éléments résiduels de la LRA dans la région, a poursuivi Dieudonné Rwabona.

Des rebelles de la LRA commettent, depuis plusieurs années, des exactions contre la population civile dans le Haut Uélé notamment dans les territoires de Faradje et Dungu. Des sources de la région affirment que ces hommes armés tuent, pillent et enlèvent la population.

En décembre 2012, la société civile les a accusé d’avoir enlevé cinq personnes dans la localité de Lidjo (Faradje), emportant du même coup des motos, des appareils électroménagers, des cartons de batteries, des pagnes et des sacs de riz non décortiqués dans la brousse.

HIGHLIGHTS/KEY PRIORITIES

• On 24 March, the Seleka coalition took full control of Bangui, and a transitional government was established. The security situation remains unpredictable. At this stage, only limited information on the populations’ needs and displacement within CAR following the latest events is available. Plans for a WFP-led emergency food security assessment are being made.

• Over the past two weeks, WFP staff present in Bangui have been in close contact with partner agencies and NGOs to assess the situation and resume activities as soon as possible. Following temporary suspension of activities, first distributions are resuming on 8 April. 8 non-critical staff had been relocated to Yaounde, Cameroon, and 7 critical staff remain in Bangui. Staff in Bangui are hosted at the BINUCA Compound with partner UN and NGO staff.
  National staff are safe and accounted for.

• Following visits to WFP premises, it was reported that part of the office, the workshop, logistics office and premises of three international staff were looted, and some of the assets stolen, including four vehicles. The warehouses and the food are intact. Security measures for all WFP sites and assets are being strengthened; to this end, discussions with Seleka forces are ongoing.

• On the basis of the rapid food security assessment carried out in February (RFSA), WFP is preparing a Budget Revision to revise the project budget to US$ 42.7 million (increase of US$ 4.7 million). This revision aims at scaling up operations to assist an additional 120,000 people in need of food assistance. Around 400,000 beneficiaries will be assisted in 2013 through PRRO 200315, which will include the populations living in the Seleka-controlled area.

Children make up majority of victims of sexual violence in many of world’s conflict and post-conflict zones, Save the Children warns, ahead of G8 meeting Children make up the majority of victims of sexual violence in many conflict and post-conflict zones, Save the Children has said, in a new report released ahead of a crucial G8 meeting in London aimed at tackling the issue.

Tuesday, 9 April 2013 - 4:08pm In its new report Unspeakable Crimes Against Children, the charity has collated figures and testimonies from a range of countries affected by conflict over the past decade, including Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Colombia.

Reliable data on the issue is limited, as much sexual abuse goes unreported, but taken together, the figures collated in the report indicate that children frequently make up the majority of sexual abuse victims in war and its aftermath.

For example, a study in Liberia – still recovering from a vicious civil war that ended a decade ago – found that more than 80% of victims of gender-based violence in 2011-12 were younger than 17. Almost all of them were raped.

Among testimonies gathered from victims and witnesses for the report, Save the Children heard of children being killed after being raped, both girls and boys kidnapped and abused by armed forces and groups, and children as young as two being attacked by opportunistic sexual predators, including teachers, religious leaders, peacekeepers, and family members.

Despite this, programmes to prevent children falling victim to sexual violence and help them recover from attacks remain chronically underfunded. The most recent complete global figures show that less than a quarter of the budget needed to protect children and women in emergencies was available, the charity said.

Justin Forsyth, Save the Children’s Chief Executive said: “It is shocking that in conflict zones around the world, children are being raped and abused at such an appalling rate. Sexual violence is one of the hidden horrors of war and the damage it wreaks ruins lives.

“Even if they recover from the physical effects of their experiences, many victims carry the psychological scars of their ordeal for the rest of their lives, and are often cast out from society. Despite all this, there are huge gaps in funding for the work needed to protect children from these atrocious crimes and to respond to their needs.”

Testimonies of witnesses and victims of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings around the world reveal the devastating impact such incidents have on children’s lives:

“Rebels were raping women, they took two girls: one was 13 and the other was 14. Then they took a 15-year-old. There were 15 or 16 [men]. The one who was 13 died because they beat her so badly.” Barakissa, aged 29, describing the abduction and rape of young girls in Mali, 2012 “I still remember the day when I was raped the first time. I was raped three times that night. I wanted to escape from them but didn’t get a chance.” Aditya, remembering the 3 years she spent (from the age of 13) captive of the Maoist militias in Nepal “It was horrible. My daughter got sick because she had been injured by what the man had done when he molested her.” Maria, recounting the medical effects after the rape of her five–year-old daughter Diana in Colombia.

During its leadership of the G8, the UK government has vowed to prioritise the issue of sexual violence in conflict. Save the Children is calling on G8 leaders to take the following concrete actions to help children who are affected:

• Fund child protection in emergencies to make sure that vulnerable children are kept safe and given help to recover from their experiences.
• Ensure that programmes aimed at dealing with sexual violence in conflict zones are focussed on children, who often make up the majority of survivors.
• End impunity for sexual violence against children, making sure that those responsible are brought to account.
• Ensure that the UN has the resources and mandate to put measures in place to effectively protect children in conflicts.

ENDS

For more information contact the Save the Children press office on 0207 012 6400 or out of hours 07831 650 409

Les autorités policières, militaires et la société civile d’Isangi (Province Orientale) ont appelé lundi 8 avril la Mission des Nations unies en RDC (Monusco) et les ONG de lutte contre les mines anti personnelles de détruire les engins non explosés trouvés depuis quelques temps et d’en rechercher d’autres. Elles ont fait cet appel après la découverte dimanche d’un obus, à la mission protestante Yalikina, un des quartiers très fréquenté de cette cité, à 125 km de Kisangani.

La cité d’Isangi compte plus de onze mille habitants, a indiqué la société civile, ajoutant que l’obus retrouvé s’ajoute à une dizaine d’autres gardés à coté de maisons d’habitation ou jetés dans les rigoles. Mais la police a assuré que l’engin retrouvé a été évacué de la mission protestante vers le bureau de la police.

Le chargé de communication de la société civile a précisé que depuis quelques semaines, sept obus ont été trouvés dans le quartier Yalosase et trois autres à Ifiti, deux quartiers populaires d’Isangi. Le quartier Yalosase avait d’ailleurs été marqué comme une zone rouge par l’ONG Afrique pour la lutte contre les mines anti personnelle (Afrilam). Cette ONG avait découvert aussi d’autres minutions à coté du fleuve, non loin du beach Lomami.

Selon le rapport de l’ONG Afrilam, les pêcheurs par ignorance repêchent ces minutions du fleuve et les amènent dans la cité.

Mais pour la société civile, ces minutions sont plutôt découvertes dans les anciennes bases des troupes ougandaises installées lors de la rébellion du RCD au début des années 2000.

04/10/2013 03:12 GMT

LONDRES, 10 avr 2013 (AFP) - L'organisation internationale d'aide à l'enfance "Charity Save the Children" a lancé mercredi un appel à une action urgente après avoir publié un rapport affirmant que la plupart des victimes d'enlèvements et d'abus sexuels dans de nombreuses zones de guerre étaient des enfants.

Le rapport intitulé "Crimes contre les Enfants" rapporte des informations et des témoignages recueillis dans plusieurs pays comme la Colombie, le Libéria et la République démocratique du Congo.

Le rapport met particulièrement l'accent sur une étude réalisée dans le Libéria d'après-guerre établissant que 82% des victimes de violences sexuelles en 2011-2012 étaient âgées de moins de dix-sept ans.

Une autre enquête effectuée dans le Sierra Leone d'après-guerre a montré que plus de 70% des violences sexuelles ont été commises contre des filles de moins de dix-huit ans.

L'ONG lance une mise en garde contre le fait que les programmes d'aide aux enfants victimes d'abus sexuels dans les zones de guerre et les régions en période d'après-guerre sont largement insuffisants.

"Il est choquant que dans les zones de conflit à travers le monde des enfants soient enlevés et violés dans des proportions aussi dramatiques", a déclaré le président de "Charity Save the Children", Justin Forsyth.

"La violence sexuelle est une des horreurs cachées de la guerre et les dégâts qu'elle engendre ruinent des vies", a ajouté M. Forsyth.

"Même si elles récupèrent des effets physiques de leurs expériences, de nombreuses victimes en gardent des séquelles psychologiques toute leur vie et sont souvent rejetées de la société. Malgré cela, de nombreux fonds manquent pour s'occuper de protéger les enfants de ces crimes affreux et répondre à leurs besoins", a encore déclaré le président de l'association.

La question devait être à l'ordre du jour de la rencontre des ministres des Affaires étrangères du G8 qui s'ouvre mercredi soir à Londres.

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© 1994-2013 Agence France-Presse

Faits saillants

• Plus de 42 000 personnes soignées gratuitement dans la Zone de santé de Lulingu depuis 2012.
• Des vivres distribués à environ 12 000 personnes déplacées à Chulwe et Luhago (Kabare).
• Les collectes forcées de vivres et les pillages des champs par des hommes armés continuent à Fizi.

Faits saillants
• Besoins en eau, hygiène et assainissement et en éducation pour plus de 15 000 personnes retournées et 4 000 personnes déplacées dans le Territoire de Lubero.
• Plus de 83 000 personnes retournées et déplacées ont été assistées à Masisi et à Rutshuru.
• Perturbation des activités scolaires pour cause d’insécurité dans la zone d’Eringeti (Beni).

Faits saillants

• Des déplacements de populations rapportés à Kasungeshi, Territoire de Mitwaba, suite aux affrontements entre Mayi Mayi et FARDC.

• Le nombre de cas de choléra à Lubumbashi a diminué de 60% entre la 12 ième et la 13 ième semaine épidémiologique de 2013.

• Une ration alimentaire de 30 jours distribuée à plus de 1 700 personnes déplacées internes à Nyemba dans le Territoire de Kalemie.

Faits saillants

• Le nombre de personnes déplacées internes a diminué de 14% au premier trimestre 2013 en Province Orientale.
• Quatre patients tuberculeux sont décédés à cause de la pénurie de médicaments à Bunia.
• D’énormes besoins humanitaires à couvrir dans les zones de santé de Niangara et Poko.

Faits saillants

• Besoin de vols humanitaires sur Gbadolite et Zongo notamment pour l’assistance aux réfugiés centrafricains
• Pluie diluvienne à Zongo : près de 400 ménages sinistrés et destruction des centres de santé et écoles
• Plusieurs personnes tuées et beaucoup de dégâts matériels enregistrés dans des conflits en Equateur

Displaced in South Sudan suffer from aftermath of LRA violence

A new report conducted by DRC/DDG in South Sudan shows that the population is still suffering from widespread and enduring social trauma as a result of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) violence, even though the militant group has disappeared from the country.

Between 2007 and 2011, attacks by Lord’s Resistance Army displaced between 70,000 and 100,000 civilians in Western Equatoria state. There have been no confirmed LRA sightings or attacks since June, 2011, but the displaced communities are still suffering from the aftermaths from the LRA violence. And while regional LRA violence continues to receive a significant degree of attention, a parallel effort to support victims of this violence has not materialized in Western Equatoria.

More than 49,000 IDPs and 12,000 refugees remain dispersed across Western Equatoria, without being able to return to their locations of origin. Living in remote areas and often being unable to establish new livelihoods or homes, the displaced suffer more than the rest of the population both in regard to security and recovery.

“Feelings of insecurity, exposure to previous LRA violence and experience of crime are significantly higher among IDP populations, many of whom feel threatened, isolated and marginalized by their host communities,” says Rebecca Roberts, head of Armed Violence Reduction, Danish Demining Group in South Sudan.

The study finds that there is an urgent need for support in the form of security and mediation services, conflict management education, psycho-social counseling and humanitarian aid.

“Without a significant increase in external support, particularly in relation to sustainable development, community-level safety and security, it is highly likely that this situation will stagnate,” says Rebecca Roberts.

DRC/DDG is supporting people in Western Equatoria, who have been affected by the LRA violence. As a conflict reduction and peace building organization, DRC/DDG focuses on the effects of violence and enduring conflict-risks.

Executive summary

The formalisation of the mining sectors in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda offers a compelling parallel to the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan (FLEGT). Both are relevant to governance in weak or fragile states, respond to the need to ensure socially and environmentally responsible sourcing of natural resources, and both resources have funded conflict– and in the case of the DRC, still do.

Industrial mining dissolved in the eastern DRC in the 1990s, due to the instability of world markets, the failure of the state and the Congo wars, and mineral exploitation became exclusively artisanal. Since then, mineral production and trade have played an important role in financing armed groups and consequently prolonging insecurity. The central government’s lack of control over the eastern part of the DRC, including the artisanal mining sector, offers an opportunity for all armed groups (state as well as nonstate) to profit from the mineral wealth. Because artisanal mining is mostly informal, it is difficult for the government to gain a hold on the sector, and to effectively tackle the ‘conflict mineral’ phenomenon. The government also misses out on a significant portion of tax revenues from the sector.

Yet, the informal and opaque nature of the sector and its role in prolonging insecurity does not necessarily mean it is wholly criminal and chaotic. Despite the involvement of armed groups, including state actors, artisanal mining is essential for local livelihoods, in an area where few alternative sources of income exist. It has been estimated that more than 500 000 miners may be working in the eastern DRC, who in turn support a wider community. The artisanal mining sector also constitutes an important source for the flow of cash into many communities.

Although the DRC’s 2002 Mining Code created some provisions to formalise the artisanal mining sector, very little has changed. Actors in the mineral chain, including miners, local traders and exporters, see little incentive to enter the formal sector. Insecurity, the tax burden, a lack of state investments and the low number of official artisanal mining zones, are the reasons most often given to explain the disincentive to act within the formal sphere. Consequently, considerable mineral production leaves the country without being registered.

These exports are transported eastwards to the seaports of Mombasa in Kenya, and Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. From there, the minerals are increasingly transported to southeast Asia, where they are refined and used for the production of electronic components and hard metals for heavy industry.

Since 2008, legislators, governments, multilateral organisations and industry organisations have made several other attempts at formalising the artisanal mining sector in the DRC and neighbouring countries, including Rwanda. This report offers an overview of all major upstream initiatives trying to ensure that mineral extraction and trade is not tainted by conflict in the DRC and the African Great Lakes region.

Three different approaches have been identified: 1) certification schemes – such as the Certified Trading Chains initiative, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region Regional Certification Mechanism, and the DRC National Certification scheme; 2) traceability systems – mainly the traceability scheme designed and implemented by the International Tin Research Institute; and 3) due diligence measures – efforts at enhancing private sector accountability carried out by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC and by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

FAITS SAILLANTS

• USD 70 millions pour financer l’urgence et la transition, innovation majeure en RDC
• Nouvelle stratégie humanitaire en Province Orientale : intégrer la transition vers le développement
• Plus de 30 000 Centrafricains en RDC depuis décembre 2012
• Médiation et dialogue, outils de paix au Nord Kivu
• 10 ans après, des milliers de Sud- Kivutiens rentrent chez eux
• Maniema cherche $5 millions pour la crise post-Punia
• Plus de 12 000 cas de rougeole depuis janvier, dépassant le nombre de cas des 24 derniers mois

Le Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés en visite en RDC

· Le Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés, Antonio Guterres, visitera la République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) du 11 au 13 avril prochain. Il se rendra à Zongo dans la Province de l'Equateur le vendredi 12 avril pour s'imprégner de la situation des réfugiés centrafricains. M. Gutterres s'entretiendra également avec les hautes autorités de la RDC. Une conférence de presse est prévue dans les locaux du HCR à Kinshasa à la fin de sa mission ce samedi 13 avril à 16h30.

En plus de la présence des réfugiés centrafricains, la ville de Zongo doit faire face à la catastrophe causeé par des pluies diluviennes du 02 au 03 avril 2013. Près de 400 maisons et plusieurs centres de santé et écoles ont été détruits, selon la société civile. Les personnes sinistrées vivent soit à la belle étoile, soit dans des familles d’accueil. Les acteurs humanitaires sont en train de voir les possibilités d’acheminer rapidement à Zongo quelques articles essentiels de ménage.

Plus de 222 000 personnes déplacées ciblées par des distributions de vivres dans le Nord-Kivu

· Quelque 222 800 personnes déplacées vont bénéficier à partir de cette semaine d’une série de distribution de vivres du Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM) dans la Province du Nord-Kivu. Ces distributions vont commencer dans les camps des déplacés gérés par le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés et vont s’étendre progressivement à tous les sites spontanés autour de la ville de Goma. En somme, ce seront quelque 1 885 tonnes de nourritures que le PAM va distribuer, en partenariat avec les ONG Caritas et World Vision. Ces vivres devraient couvrir les besoins alimentaires des bénéficiaires pendant 15 jours.

· Dans la Province du Sud-Kivu, près de 12 000 personnes déplacées de Chulwe et Luhango, Territoire de Kabare, ont bénéficié d’une distribution de 198 tonnes de vivres. Ces vivres distribués par le PAM, en collaboration avec son partenaire ICCO, constituent des rations de 30 jours. Les bénéficiaires ont fui les territoires de Shabunda et Mwenga depuis le mois de septembre et octobre 2012 suite aux affrontements entre les FARDC et des groupes armés (Raiya Mutomboki et FDLR). En concertation avec les représentants de bénéficiaires, les distributions ont eu lieu à Mulamba, Territoire de Walungu, suite au mauvais état du pont de Kankinda qui n’a pas permis l’acheminement des vivres à Culwe et Luhango.

La population civile victime de tracasseries et exactions dans plusieurs territoires du Sud-Kivu

· La communauté humanitaire du Sud-Kivu est préoccupée par les incidents de protection contre les populations civiles dans plusieurs territoires. Dans le Territoire de Fizi, des éléments armés opèrent de façon récurrente des collectes de vivres auprès des populations de Kilembwe. A Katupu, des éléments présumés FDLR pillent les champs de la population locale. Tandis que, à Kananda et Sebele, des éléments des groupes armés en attente d’intégration au sein des FARDC, font des collectes de vivres forcées auprès de la population. Ce même comportement est aussi observé à Makelele, dans le Territoire de Kalehe, où des groupes armés attendent leur intégration dans l’armée nationale. Le processus de cantonnement des groupes armés pour leur intégration au sein des Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) s’accompagnent parfois des pillages et des extorsions lors de l’acheminement des éléments vers leur lieu de regroupement.

Sylvestre Ntumba Mudingayi
Assistant Information Officer
Public Information and Advocacy Section
Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo
Mob: +243 99 88 45 386
ntumbamudingayi@un.org

Interpreted by some as the UN’s first authorization for the use of offensive force, UN Security Council Resolution 2098 passed on March 29 and called for the deployment of an “intervention brigade” to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that can use offensive combat operations to “neutralize and disarm” Congolese rebel groups, in particular the M23 rebels responsible for taking over Goma in the eastern DRC last year.

Despite the declaration by the UN that this breaks new ground, the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) is already authorized to conduct offensive operations under its Chapter VII mandate, as are all other missions operating under Chapter VII. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) in these missions authorize the use of force beyond self-defense.

As MONUSCO, and its predecessor MONUC, already have this authorization, the Security Council and DPKO should instead analyze how and why the mission has failed on notable occasions to fulfill its priority of protecting civilians before prescribing the solution in the form of an intervention brigade.

Key Conclusions

• This new authorization is not a step-change in peacekeeping operations, but an evolution in response to increasingly complex and high-risk operating environments. These changes have been underway for some time, but require a shift in the mindset of troop contributors.
• The UN is authorized to take proactive military action under Chapter VII, but the articles are interpreted differently by troop contributors, some of whom are reluctant to acknowledge that Chapter VII supports the use of force beyond self defense. Peacekeepers can already take action to disrupt rebel activity through preemptive operations using surprise and tempo to pursue armed groups without needing to wait for attacks on civilians or on the mission, but it requires political will.
• Offensive operations need not endanger civilians any more than defensive operations, but firm protection measures must be incorporated into operational planning.
• Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former UN Force Divisional Commander for MONUC in the DRC, supports reinforcement of MONUSCO, but he questions how this new mandate will sit alongside the existing force, and is critical of the lack of analysis of the current MONUSCO requirements.
• The deployment of an intervention brigade should not be used as a substitute for a longer-term strategy of security sector reform and a review of the force requirements of the mission.

Analysis

The new intervention brigade in the DRC will be made up of contributions from South African Development Community (SADC) countries, notably South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, who will collectively supply 3,069 troops comprising three infantry battalions and their supporting elements. It will deploy for one year and will be under the command of the MONUSCO force commander.

The announcement of the intervention brigade in the DRC in Resolution 2098 was framed as the “first ever ‘offensive’ combat force;” however, offensive operations are already authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Chapter VII mandates typically permit the use of force beyond self-defense to ensure the freedom of movement of the mission, protect civilians, and for the protection of UN personnel and property. Previous field commanders have interpreted their mandates as such to allow UN forces to actively pursue rebel groups and to preempt and disrupt rebel movement ahead of time. Examples of this include the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (UNSTAMIH) and the United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNISOM II).

This “robust” posture sits uneasily with many observers and contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Concerns have been voiced as to whether the United Nations is the appropriate mechanism to resolve the crisis in the DRC, and if in fact increased offensive military operations will further endanger civilians who may become caught in the cross fire, or be deliberately targeted in response. Past attempts to launch offensive operations against rebel groups, such as those waged against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) by Ugandan forces in 2008, have resulted in violent reprisals against the civilian population, as the operations were conducted without adequate accompanying measures to protect civilians in the area of operations. The planning for any forthcoming escalation in offensive operations in the DRC must therefore meticulously plan for protection measures beyond the military engagements with the rebels.

In January 2013, a letter from the UN Secretary-General noted that consultations with the major troop contributors had identified the requirement for an increase in the number of attack and utility helicopters, the need for night-vision capabilities, and for additional information capabilities to enhance situational awareness and permit timely decision making. Also identified were more surveillance assets and greater riverine capabilities to enhance coverage on lakes and rivers in the Kivus. A systematic analysis of incidents since 2007 in the eastern part of the DRC culminating in the fall of Goma in November 2012 would provide a valuable framework to develop force requirements to prevent a recurrence of such incidents, and may indicate that more infantry battalions are not why the mission was unable to operate effectively.

The UN announced that the intervention brigade would carry out operations “in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner” but it will require mobility assets (helicopters) to do that. Who will provide these extra supporting elements is unclear. Earlier this year, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) announced the deployment of unarmed drones to the DRC in support of the mission. Along with community relations and existing early warning mechanisms, they could now be used in support of the intervention brigade’s operations, but the collection of information must be supported by analysis and dissemination support.

The request for the intervention brigade was, however, conceived by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), supported by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), who requested “an intervention brigade [which] would have the peace-enforcement tasks.”

Major General Patrick Cammaert, a former UN Force Divisional Commander for MONUC in the DRC, says he supports reinforcement of MONUSCO, but he questions how the new forces will sit alongside the existing force, and is critical of the lack of analysis of the current MONUSCO requirements.

Says Cammaert: “No one has conducted an analysis of why, over the last five years or so, MONUSCO has been unable or unwilling to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians, and until we have the outcome of this analysis we cannot determine if the solution is an intervention brigade.”

In Cammaert’s opinion, “The issue is not that proactive operations are not already authorized, but that troop contributors are risk averse, and show time and again a lack of political will to employ a full reading of the mandate, leading to accusations that it lacks robustness.” In the end, “the mandate is only as strong as the will of the leadership and the TCCs to implement it.”

General Cammaert questions how this would operate on the ground alongside the existing MONUSCO troops.

“Is one brigade to be responsible for enforcing peace through the use of force and the other not? Is one set of rules of engagement to differ from the other, and if not, why deploy a new brigade with the same rules of engagement and force posture as the existing one?”

“The regular forces of the military component still have in the new Security Council resolution the mandate to protect civilians using force beyond self-defense. Will they now implement this as they previously did not, or will they call the intervention brigade?”

General Cammaert notes the confusion this would cause, not just among the troops responsible for deploying force, but among the local population who would have a greater reasonable expectation of action for their protection.

As actions against the LRA demonstrated, what happens after the withdrawal of the intervention brigade may be just as critical as the period of the operations. This short term “surge” may create more agile and proactive operations, but the longer-term requirement to build the capacity of an indigenous security force remains. Should the intervention brigade or the regular forces be successful in securing ground or clearing rebel-held territory, Congolese forces will be left to consolidate any gains and guard against reprisals. The formulation and implementation of this strategy should be addressed now to avoid a vacuum after the intervention or a loss of momentum following the “surge.”

Now that the intervention brigade has been authorized, operational planning should focus on robust control measures to protect civilians in the area of operations, and international efforts should shift to long-term capacity building to ensure sustainable security for the people of the DRC.

Fiona Blyth is a former military intelligence officer with the British Army who is a Research Assistant in the Africa program at the International Peace Institute.

Originally published in the Global Observatory

Executive Summary

Security Council Report’s third Cross-Cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security analyses statistical information on women, peace and security in country-specific decisions of the Security Council and developments in 2012, with a particular focus in the case study on the nexus between sexual violence in conflict and sanctions imposed by the Security Council. The report also examines the Council’s inconsistency in including language on the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse for UN personnel in resolutions establishing or renewing mandates for peace missions. The report will also briefly touch on key developments on the women, peace and security agenda in early 2013.

Since our first Cross-Cutting Report on Women, Peace and Security in 2010, there has been significant growth in the UN system’s focus on this thematic issue. The first Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict was appointed in February 2010, and in January 2011 a system-wide entity on women’s equality and empowerment, UN Women, was established. Both the head of UN Women and the Special Representative have briefed the Security Council regularly since taking up their respective positions.

Three years since the start of these institutional processes, it seems appropriate to examine how the establishment of these offices at UN headquarters, the continued deployment of gender expertise in the field as well as gender expertise supplementing the work of various sanctions committees’ experts groups have complemented the Security Council’s own approach to the women, peace and security agenda. This report will assess whether a more robust women, peace and security infrastructure has improved the flow of information to the Security Council and, if so, whether such improvement, in turn, has translated into an enhanced focus on these matters in Council decision-making, and in particular, in the work of its sanctions committees.

Specifically, this report examines the Council’s follow-through on its own intention expressed in resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010) to consider including designation criteria for the imposition of sanctions pertaining to acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence. To examine the nexus between sexual violence and activity by the Security Council and its sanctions committees, this report reviews the mandates of relevant sanctions regimes, the application of sanctions and relevant listing and designation criteria and reporting by associated expert groups on sexual and gender-based violence.

The report will consider the sanctions regimes imposed on Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Somalia and Sudan as examples of the Security Council’s approach to women, peace and security issues—in particular whether such tools have been used to enhance accountability for sexual violence in armed conflict. In addressing the issue of accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence, the case study will also briefly touch on parallel international justice mechanisms where they exist.

The past two years have been a time of particular division in the Council, with significant push-back by several permanent and elected Council members on the key thematic issues including on women, peace and security, children and armed conflict and protection of civilians. There has been repeated criticism by some Council members that the reporting on women, peace and security, particularly on sexual violence, has gone beyond its mandate by including countries that are not on the Security Council’s agenda. However, the overarching observation of this study is that this push-back has largely played itself out in difficult and protracted negotiations at the thematic level but has not negatively impacted the integrity of the Council’s women, peace and security normative framework.

Interestingly, despite this controversy at the thematic level, the women, peace and security agenda continued to be substantively applied in the Council’s country-specific resolutions, the Council expanded its work at the committee-level when considering sexual violence or rape as designation criteria in various sanctions regimes and there has been regular interaction between the Council and UN Women and the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Council’s interaction with the Special Representative has been especially notable at both the Council level—insofar as she has briefed not only on her broader mandate but also on several country-specific situations—and her office’s interactions with several expert groups of the Council’s sanctions committees.

However, the study did reveal one area of concern regarding the Council’s inclusion of the UN’s zero-tolerance policy in its relevant resolutions. In a review of the resolutions in effect in 2012 for 12 peacekeeping operations and seven political and peacebuilding missions, only eight had mandates that included a reference to the zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse for UN personnel. In practice, the Council has not been involved in the matter and the issue has been left to the discretion of the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries.

Observations and Possible Future Options The overarching observation of this study has found that the pushback trend of the last two years has largely played itself out in difficult and protracted negotiations at the thematic level but has not negatively impacted the integrity of the women, peace and security normative framework.

Interestingly, despite the controversy among Council members at the thematic level, the women, peace and security agenda has continued to be substantively applied in country-specific resolutions. For example, in 2012 there seemed to be a trend for the Council to incorporate women, peace and security language at the outset when it became seized of a new situation, such as in its resolutions on Mali, or in response to a changing dynamic, such as the emergence of the M23 in the DRC. The outliers from this overall positive trend were Guinea-Bissau and Syria.

The Council expanded its work at the sanctions committee-level when considering sexual violence or rape as designation criteria in various sanctions regimes as a tool to enhance accountability. To further strengthen its work in this regard the Council could, however:

• Expand the designation criteria in other relevant sanctions regimes where sexual violence in conflict is persistently perpetrated. Perhaps specifically taking up the Secretary-General’s call in his 2013 report on sexual violence for the Sanctions Committees on Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan and Al-Qaida in the context of Mali to focus on such issues.
• Request sanctions committees, when updating their consolidated lists, to harmonise designation criteria for listed individuals by including any relevant charges from international justice mechanisms (for example, in the case of the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee, Bosco Ntaganda has been on the sanctions list since 2005, but the justification for his designation has not been updated to include sexual violence despite an ICC arrest warrant that included charges for such violations).
• Formally call for information-sharing between the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict and the sanctions committees and associated expert groups, as is the case with the 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee.
• Welcome the submission of perpetrators’ names by the Special Representative to the relevant sanctions committees and ensure follow-up at committee-level to determine whether to adopt targeted or graduated measures against such individuals or entities.
• Formally require expert groups assisting sanctions committees to include, where relevant, reporting on sexual and gender-based violence and to include gender experts as part of the composition of such expert groups.

The interaction by the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict with the Council has been especially notable. The Special Representative has briefed not only on her broader mandate but also on several country-specific situations. The Council could consolidate into practice briefings by the Special Representative prior to mandate renewals or on unfolding situations of conflict where sexual violence is a concern. Similarly, the Council could extend such a practice to the Executive Director of UN Women, particularly when the Council is considering a mandate to support post-conflict structures in a country-specific situation, which should ensure broad participation and decision-making by women.

Implementation of the monitoring and reporting arrangements, or MARA, has begun but is proceeding slowly. MARA tasks are linked to women’s protection advisers, but in 2012 the first and only advisers were only deployed to UNMISS in South Sudan. Facing a difficult fiscal situation and low political will, the Secretariat will be hard-pressed to deploy more advisers without a clear mandate from the Council. To bolster the capacity of MARA reporting, the Council could include in relevant country-specific resolutions an unambiguous request for the deployment of women’s protection advisers—as it did in March 2013 when it renewed the MONUSCO mandate in resolution 2098.

Regarding Security Council visiting missions, whenever the women, peace and security agenda was incorporated into the terms of reference, the Council engaged with relevant stakeholders on the ground, albeit to varying degrees. However, when such issues were not included in the terms of reference, then the issue was subsequently overlooked by Council members when they were in a country. The Council could make a concerted effort to consistently incorporate a gender perspective into its terms of references for visiting missions. It is clear that such interactions and stakeholder feedback will not occur spontaneously.

While the study revealed a continued positive trend in reporting by the Secretary-General on women, peace and security issues in his country-specific reports, there remains room for improvement. In particular, the Council could request more robust reporting on gender issues and the inclusion of a separate section covering women, peace and security. Several country-specific reports in 2012 did not use such a separate heading or section, such as those on Afghanistan, Darfur, Iraq, Kosovo and Libya. This should be achievable as the UN missions in these countries had personnel with gender expertise in 2012. This could also be an objective for any reporting coming out of a possible UN peacekeeping mission in Mali.

Another area of concern revealed by this study was the inconsistency of the Council in including language in resolutions on the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by its own personnel. An immediate measure the Council could take is ensuring consistent inclusion of this policy in all resolutions renewing or establishing peace mission mandates and specifically reiterating its call from the May 2005 presidential statement for follow-up reporting on such allegations in relevant Secretary-General’s reports.

The Council has created several tools with considerable potential of having an impact on women, peace and security issues on the ground. It has not, however, applied these tools consistently or, in some cases, at all. This is true regarding the lack of uniform inclusion of the UN’s zero-tolerance policy in Council resolutions establishing or authorising missions. Regarding sexual violence in conflict, the Council has been regularly engaged with the issue—even if the expansion of designation criteria, the application of sanctions for such atrocities or calls for accountability is less than consistent. In contrast, there are worrying indications that the Council’s focus is less sharp when it comes to the women’s participation aspect of this thematic agenda. While some of this is certainly related to the overall political climate and pushback described earlier, it also appears that in some cases it may be simply due to lapses in oversight of the broad spectrum of issues presented by the women, peace and security agenda.

KEY POINTS

1. Sexual violence is not geographically or demographically discrete; it is a global issue that affects all ages and genders.

2. Children are a key target group due to their societal status and multiple vulnerabilities in areas affected by conflict.

3. Sexual violence is pervasive in all settings (public and private) and is more likely to be opportunistic than a tactic of war.

4. The perpetrators of sexual violence are more often civilian than they are combatants.

On March 23, 245 combatants from the militia group Kata Katanga marched into Lubumbashi in Katanga Province, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). After entering the UN Peacekeeping base there, the combatants, including 40 minors, reportedly surrendered and were disarmed. With support from USAID, UNICEF and its local partner Reconfort responded to the situation within hours, verifying and separating these 40 children from the surrendered group. UNICEF successfully negotiated to allow the children to be turned over for care in the transit center, rather than be handed over to government officials along with the Kata Katanga adult combatants.

These children, all boys between the ages of 10 and 17 who UNICEF and Reconfort were able to literally “separate” from the armed group, were placed in a transit center in Lubumbashi, which Reconfort was able to open, stock, and staff within a single day as a result of USAID’s ongoing work to improve the local organization’s capacity. In the transit center, these 40 boys are getting shelter, protection, medical care, psychosocial support, and opportunities for recreational and educational activities. Over the next few months, the youth will be reintegrated into their families and communities and enrolled in school or vocational training programs.

Since 2011, USAID’s child protection work with UNICEF has separated over 1,100 children from armed groups in North Kivu, South Kivu, Orientale, and Katanga provinces, provided separated children with temporary care in transit centers or foster families, supported their reintegration into their communities, and helped an additional 5,000 conflict-affected children to enroll in school or obtain vocational skills training. In addition, USAID has strengthened the capacity of 15 local organizations, like Reconfort, that are assisting children associated with armed groups, and we have created or strengthened over 70 community committees to promote child rights at the grassroots level and prevent child recruitment into armed groups. USAID has recently signed an agreement to continue UNICEF’s child protection project, bringing the total project amount to $5 million. This new agreement will give the project more geographic flexibility and build more capacity among local organizations to ensure rapid response to unexpected events like this one.

Les habitants de plusieurs entités administratives du Nord du Katanga vivent dans la misère et dans l’absence de l’autorité de l’Etat. Selon des députés provinciaux élus dans les circonscriptions du Nord, Cette situation serait, selon eux, à la base de l’émergence des groupes Maï-Maï qu’ils ont qualifiés pour la plupart de groupes des bandits. Ces députés s’exprimaient au cours d’une plénière tenue, lundi 8 avril, à l’assemblée provinciale du Katanga.

Le député Janvier Mulaya craint que la chasse aux miliciens «Bakata Katanga » que mène un ancien chef Maï-Maï dans la chefferie de Nganye dans le territoire de Moba ne se transforme en conflit intercommunautaire entre les Baluba et les Tabwa. Selon ce député, cet ancien chef milicien, du nom de «Katenda», a été sollicité par les FARDC pour traquer les Maï Maï Bakata Katanga.

Les députés provinciaux dénoncent le fait que des militaires FARDC occupent des carrières de coltan et de cassitérite à Manono. Conséquence : certains jeunes s’érigent en groupe de résistance et se font passer pour des Maï-Maï pour défendre leurs terres.

Dans le Haut-Lomami, les députés affirment que les anciens seigneurs de guerre qui avaient déposé les armes ne sont plus actifs. Les Maï-Maï qui opèrent encore sur place «sont tout simplement des bandits, qui profitent de l’absence de l’autorité de l’Etat pour manipuler les jeunes désœuvrés».

A ce sujet, le grand chef Mulongo de la chefferie du même nom, qui est également député provincial, a expliqué la méthode utilisée par les miliciens:

«Quelques pêcheurs en eau trouble contactent ces jeunes et les attirent par des promesses fallacieuses en leur promettant monts et merveilles. C’est le cas des Bakata Katanga, qui croient qu’avec l’avènement d’un nouveau Katanga indépendant, ils vont peut-être trouver la paix et le bonheur. Ce pays doit être gouverné et administré.»

La plénière à l’assemblée provinciale s’est déroulée en présence des trois ministres provinciaux. Il s’agit du ministre près le gouverneur, de l’Intérieur ainsi que de la Santé et affaires sociales, qui ont été invités à la plénière. Celle-ci devrait reprendre, ce mercredi, avec l’analyse de la situation dans le reste de la province.

Written by Yawo Douvon, CARE Country Director, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Two weeks ago, Yawo Douvon, CARE’s Country Director in the Democratic Republic of Congo, found himself showing Angelina Jolie and UK foreign minister William Hague around the Lac Vert camp for displaced people near Goma, where they had come to meet rape survivors. Today, as the G8 foreign ministers gather in London to sign a declaration on preventing sexual violence in conflict, he calls on them to listen to the voices from Goma, support Hague's initiative, and provide the means to make it work.

Eastern DRC is known as the ‘rape capital of the world’ and, as VIP visitors have come and gone over the years, it is easy to become cynical and wonder if warzone rape can ever truly be tackled given its prevalence and complex causes. Some within the media were sceptical when the British Foreign Secretary and the Hollywood actress visited DRC, thinking perhaps it was more of a PR trip than anything. But, guiding them around the camp as part of Hague’s initiative for preventing sexual violence in conflict, I was struck by their sincerity and passion.

We introduced them to women like Marie and Josephine who recounted the horrific experiences they had suffered. We also showed them CARE’s work helping survivors of sexual violence with their immediate needs for medical care, shelter, water and food, as well as the longer-term psychological support and financial assistance they need to move on with their lives. Hague was particularly interested in hearing about the situation of rape survivors in order to better understand how they can be supported in the aftermath of an attack and protected from future violence. He was moved by meeting unaccompanied children and asked what was being done to reunite them with their parents. Jolie was shocked by the level of atrocity experienced by the women she met, and wanted to know more about what could be done to help them. She was interested in how important cash transfers were to the women she spoke to and how they represent hope for them to be able to rebuild their lives.

As the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting takes place in London tomorrow, I hope that Hague will bring the voices of Marie, Josephine and the others like them that he met on his visit to DRC and Rwanda to the attention of his fellow foreign ministers. The task of tackling warzone rape may be colossal, but I applaud his efforts to seek an end to an atrocity which has brought so much misery and terror not only to so many ordinary Congolese people, but also to countless others the world over.

Hague has declared a campaign to tackle impunity. By seeking to put in place an international protocol to increase prosecutions, he aims to send the message to perpetrators of warzone rape that their crimes will no longer go unpunished and rape will no longer be seen as an inevitable consequence of conflict. He has invested in a team of experts to gather evidence, investigate and prosecute such crimes. This is important first step on what will be a long and arduous journey.

It’s encouraging to see a world leader – and a man – take a stance on this difficult issue and stake his reputation on it. I see in the villages in which CARE works in DRC how much more progress is made when not only women but also men challenge custom and practice, and take a stand against sexual violence.

I know of course that more is required to address the root causes of violence in Eastern DRC, which are complex and deep-seated. They involve competition for control of natural resources by various armed groups and deep grievances over power between different ethnic groups. Impunity for sexual violence crimes is rooted in wider lawlessness, which requires the wholesale reform of the national justice and security sectors.

An international protocol to tackle impunity together with deployments of UK experts can therefore help, but they cannot substitute for – and will not work without – long-term, difficult work to reform such institutions on the ground. So, the diplomatic initiatives launched at the G8 will need to link to long-term aid programmes, to address the unique and complex set of circumstances faced by the DRC and the different – but no doubt just as complex – sets of circumstances faced by every other state or region affected by conflict.

And, if they are to benefit from this work, the survivors themselves must see their immediate needs met – for life-saving medical assistance, as well as longer-term health, counselling and livelihoods support to put their lives back together. This is what I showed Hague and Jolie during their visit to Lac Vert and it is this support which remains chronically underfunded. What I hope now is that the G8 nations will review their funding to countries affected by conflict, and work with the UN and agencies like CARE to assess how to plug the gaps in frontline services for survivors. It should not be beyond our collective ability to ensure that whoever needs life-saving assistance receives it. We have just lacked the resources and political will to make this happen, until now.

As I said earlier, I hope that the stories of Marie and Josephine are still vivid in Hague’s mind and that he will share these with his fellow foreign ministers. I ask the other G8 countries, on behalf of the many rape survivors we at CARE have assisted over the years in DRC and other war-torn states, to listen to the voices from Goma and act to end the heinous crime of warzone rape.

By launching his initiative to prevent sexual violence in conflict, Hague has said ‘enough is enough’. Now it is time for the other powerful governments of the G8 to join his call and provide the means to put it into action.